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Introduction 
IN 1HE middle of the twentieth century, it came to be believed that 'a rising tide 
lifts all boats': economic growth would bring increasing wealth and higher liv-
ing standards to all sections of society. At the time, there was some evidence 
behind that claim. In industrialised countries in the 1950s and 1960s every 
group was advancing, and those with lower incomes were rising most rapidly. 
In the ensuing economic and political debate, this 'rising-tide hypothesis' 
evolved into a much more specific idea, according to which regressive eco-
nomic policies-policies that favour the richer classes-would end up bene-
fiting everyone. Resources given to the rich would inevitably 'trickle down' 
to the rest. It is important to clarify that this version of old-fashioned 
'trickle-down economics' did not follow from the postwar evidence. The 'ris-
ing-tide hypothesis' was equally consistent with a 'trickle-up' theory-give 
more money to those at the bottom and everyone will benefit; or with a 
'build-out from the middle' theory-help those at the centre, and both those 
above and below will benefit. 
Today the trend to greater equality of incomes which characterised the 
postwar period has been reversed. Inequality is now rising rapidly. Contrary 
to the rising-tide hypothesis, the rising tide has only lifted the large yachts, 
and many of the smaller boats have been left dashed on the rocks. This is 
partly because the extraordinary growth in top incomes has coincided with 
an economic slowdown. 
The trickle-down notion-along with its theoretical justification, marginal 
productivity theory-needs urgent rethinking. That theory attempts both to 
explain inequality-why it occurs-and to justify it-why it would be benefi-
cial for the economy as a whole. This chapter looks critically at both claims. 
It argues in favour of alternative explanations of inequality, with particular 
reference to the theory of rent-seeking and to the influence of institutional 
and political factors, which have shaped labour markets and patterns of 
remuneration. And it shows that, far from being either necessary or good for 
economic growth, excessive inequality tends to lead to weaker economic per-
formance. In light of this, it argues for a range of policies that would 
increase both equity and economic well-being. 
The great rise of inequality 
Let us start by examining the ongoing trends in income and wealth. In the 
past three decades, those at the top have done very well, especially in the 
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US. Between 1980 and 2014, the richest 1 per cent have seen their average 
real income increase by 169 per cent (from $469,403, adjusted for inflation, to 
$1,260,508) and their share of national income more than double, from 
10 per cent to 21 per cent. The top 0.1 per cent have fared even better. Over 
the same period, their average real income increased by 281 per cent (from 
$1,597,080, adjusted for inflation, to $6,087,113) and their share of national 
income almost tripled, from 3.4 to 10.3 per cent.1 
Over the same thirty-four years, median household income grew by only 
11 per cent. And this growth actually occurred only in the very first years of 
the period: by 2014 it was only .7 per cent higher than in 1989, after peaking 
in 1999.2 But even this underestimates the extent to which those at the bottom 
have suffered-their incomes have only done as well as they have because 
hours worked have increased. Median hourly compensation (adjusted for 
inflation) increased by only 9 per cent from 1973 to 2014, even though at the 
same time productivity grew by 72.2 per cent (Figure 1). (To understand how 
significant this divergence of productivity and wages is, consider that from 
1948 to 1973 both increased at the same pace, about doubling over the per-
iod.)3 And these statistics underestimate the true deterioration in workers' 
wages, for education levels have increased (the percentage of Americans 
who are college graduates has nearly doubled since 1980, to more than 
30 per cent),4 so that one should have expected a significant increase in wage 
rates. In fact, average real hourly wages for all Americans with only a high 
school diploma have decreased in the past three decades.5' 6 
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Figure 1: Wages, productivity and average incomes in the US {1973-2014) 
Notes: (left panel) Data are for average hourly compensation of production/nonsupervisory 
workers in the private sector and net productivity of the total economy. 'Net productivity' is 
the growth of output of goods and services minus depreciation per hour worked. EPI analysis 
of data from the BEA and BLS (see technical appendix for more detailed information). 
Sources: Economic Policy Institute (left panel); The World Wealth and Income Database. 
Facundo Alvaredo, Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman 
(right panel) 
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In the first three years of the so-called recovery from the Great Recession 
of 2008-2009-in other words, since the US economy returned to growth-
fully 91 per cent of the gains in income went to the top 1 per cent. By 2014, 
the rest of the income distribution had experienced a bit more of a boost, 
but even accounting for that, 58 per cent of the gains in total income have 
gone to the top 1 per cent since 2009. (During that period, the income of the 
bottom 99 per cent has grown by just 4 per cent. )7 Presidents Bush and 
Obama both tried a trickle-down strategy-giving large amounts of money 
to the banks and the bankers. The idea was simple: by saving the banks and 
bankers, all would benefit. The banks would restart lending. The wealthy 
would create more jobs. This strategy, it was argued, would be far more 
efficacious than helping homeowners, businesses or workers directly. The 
US Treasury typically demands that when money is given to developing 
countries, conditions be imposed on them to ensure not only that the money 
is used well, but also that the country adopts economic policies that (accord-
ing to the Treasury's economic theories) will lead to growth. But no condi-
tions were imposed on the banks-not even, for example, requirements that 
they lend more or stop abusive practices. The rescue worked in enriching 
those at the top; but the benefits did not trickle down to the rest of the 
economy. 
The Federal Reserve, too, tried trickle-down economics. One of the main 
channels by which quantitative easing was supposed to rekindle growth was 
by leading to higher stock market prices, which would generate higher 
wealth for the very rich, who would then spend some of that, which in turn 
would benefit the rest. 
As Yeva Nersisyan and Randall Wray argue in their chapter in this vol-
ume, both the Fed and the Administration could have tried policies that 
more directly benefited the rest of the economy: helping homeowners, lend-
ing to small and medium-sized enterprises and fixing the broken credit 
channel. These trickle-down policies were relatively ineffective----one reason 
why seven years after the US slipped into recession, the economy was still 
not back to health. 
Wealth is even more concentrated than income-by one estimate more 
than ten times so. The wealthiest 1 per cent of Americans hold 41.8 per cent 
of the country's wealth; the top 0.1 per cent alone control more than 
22 per cent of total wealth. 8 Just one example of the extremes of wealth in 
America is the Walton family: the six heirs to the Walmart empire command 
a wealth of $145 billion, which is equivalent to the net worth of 1,782,020 
average American families.9 
Wealth inequality too is on the upswing. For the four decades before the 
Great Recession, the rich were getting wealthier at a more rapid pace than 
everyone else. Between 1978 and 2013 the share of wealth owned by the top 
1 per cent rose dramatically, from less than 25 per cent to its current level 
above 40 per cent; the share of the top 10 per cent from about two-thirds to 
well over three-quarters.10 By 2010, the crisis had depleted some of the 
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richest Americans' wealth because of the decline in stock prices, but many 
Americans also had had their wealth almost entirely wiped out as their 
homes lost value. After the crisis, the average wealthiest 1 per cent of house-
holds still had 165 times the wealth of the average American in the bottom 
90 per cent-more than double the ratio of thirty years ago.11 In the years of 
'recovery', as stock market values rebounded (in part as a result of the Fed's 
lopsided efforts to resuscitate the economy through increasing the balance 
sheet of the rich}, the rich have regained much of the wealth that they had 
lost; the same did not happen to the rest of the country.12 
Inequality plays out along ethnic lines in ways that should be disturbing 
for a country that had begun to see itself as having won out against racism. 
Between 2005 and 2009, a huge number of Americans saw their wealth dras-
tically decrease. The net worth of the typical white American household was 
down substantially, to $113,149 in 2009, a 16 per cent loss of wealth from 
2005. But the recession was much worse for other groups. The typical 
African American household lost 53 per cent of its wealth-putting its assets 
at a mere 5 per cent of the median white American's. The typical Hispanic 
household lost 66 per cent of its wealth.13 
Probably the most invidious aspect of America's inequality is that of 
opportunities: in the US a young person's life prospects depend heavily on 
the income and education of his or her parents, even more than in other 
advanced countries.14 The 'American dream' is largely a myth. 
A number of studies have noted the link between inequality of outcomes 
and inequality of opportunities.15 When there are large inequalities of 
income, those at the top can buy for their offspring privileges not available to 
others, and they often come to believe that it is their right and obligation to 
do so. And, of course, without equality of opportunity those born in the bot-
tom of the distribution are likely to end up there: inequalities of outcomes 
perpetuate themselves. This is deeply troubling: given our low level of equal-
ity of opportunity and our high level of inequality of income and wealth, it is 
possible that the future will be even worse, with still further increases in 
inequality of outcome and still further decreases in equality of opportunity. 
A generalised international trend 
While the US has been winning the race to be the most unequal country (at 
least within developed economies}, much of what has just been described 
for it has also been going on elsewhere. In the past twenty-five to thirty 
years the Gini index-the widely used measure of income inequality-has 
increased by roughly 29 per cent in the United States, 17 per cent in 
Germany, 9 per cent in Canada, 14 per cent in UK, 12 per cent in Italy and 
11 per cent in Japan (Figure 2).16 The more countries follow the American 
economic model, the more the results seem to be consistent with what has 
occurred in the United States. The UK has now achieved the second highest 
level of inequality among the countries of Western Europe and North 
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top 10 per cent's wealth share increased from 64.1 per cent to 70.5 per cent 
over the same period.17 
Also disturbing are the patterns that have emerged in transition econo-
mies, which at the beginning of their movement to a market economy had 
low levels of inequality in income and wealth (at least according to available 
measurements). Today, China's inequality of income, as measured by its 
Gini coefficient, is roughly comparable to that of the United States and 
Russia.18 Across the OECD, since 1985 the Gini coefficient has increased in 
seventeen of twenty-two countries for which data is available, often dramati-
cally (Figure 2). 
Moreover, recent research by Piketty and his co-authors has found that 
the importance of inherited wealth has increased in recent decades, at least 
in the rich countries for which we have data. After displaying a decreasing 
trend in the first postwar period, the share of inheritance flows in disposable 
income has been increasing in the past decades.19 
Explaining inequality 
How can we explain these worrying trends? Traditionally, there has been lit-
tle consensus among economists and social thinkers on what causes inequal-
ity. In the nineteenth century, they strived to explain and either justify or 
criticise the evident high levels of disparity. Marx talked about exploitation. 
Nassau Senior, the first holder of the first chair in economics, the Drum-
mond Professorship at All Souls College, Oxford, talked about the returns to 
capital as a payment for capitalists' abstinence, for their not consuming.20 It 
was not exploitation of labour, but the just rewards for their forgoing con-
sumption. Neoclassical economists developed the marginal productivity the-
ory, which argued that compensation more broadly reflected different 
individuals' contributions to society. 
While exploitation suggests that those at the top get what they get by tak-
ing away from those at the bottom, marginal productivity theory suggests 
that those at the top only get what they add. The advocates of this view have 
gone further: they have suggested that in a competitive market, exploitation 
(e.g. as a result of monopoly power or discrimination) simply couldn't persist, 
and that additions to capital would cause wages to increase, so workers 
would be better off thanks to the savings and innovation of those at the top. 
More specifically, marginal productivity theory maintains that, due to com-
petition, everyone participating in the production process earns remuneration 
equal to her or his marginal productivity. This theory associates higher 
incomes with a greater contribution to society. This can justify, for instance, 
preferential tax treatment for the rich: by taxing high incomes we would 
deprive them of the 'just deserts' for their contribution to society, and, even 
more importantly, we would discourage them from expressing their talent.21 
Moreover, the more they contribute-the harder they work and the more 
they save-the better it is for workers, whose wages will rise as a result. 
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ownership claims. Thus, rent-seeking means getting an income not as a 
reward for creating wealth but by grabbing a larger share of the wealth that 
would have been produced anyway. Indeed, rent-seekers typically destroy 
wealth, as a by-product of their taking away from others. A monopolist who 
overcharges for her or his product takes money from those whom she or he is 
overcharging and at the same time destroys value. To get her or his monopoly 
price, she or he has to restrict production. 
Growth in top incomes in the past three decades has been driven mainly in 
two occupational categories: those in the financial sector (both executives and 
professionals) and non-financial executives.23 Evidence suggests that rents have 
contributed on a large scale to the strong increase in the incomes of both. 
Let us first consider executives in general. That the rise in their compensa-
tion has not reflected productivity is indicated by the lack of correlation 
between managerial pay and firm performance. As early as 1990 Jensen and 
Murphy, by studying a sample of 2,505 CEOs in 1,400 companies, found that 
annual changes in executive compensation did not reflect changes in corpo-
rate performance.24 Since then, the work of Bebchuk, Fried and Grinstein 
has shown that the huge increase in US executive compensation since 1993 
cannot be explained by firm performance or industrial structure and that, 
instead, it has mainly resulted from flaws in corporate governance, which 
enabled managers in practice to set their own pay.25 Mishel and Sabadish 
examined 350 firms, showing that growth in the compensation of their CEOs 
largely outpaced the increase in their stock market value. Most strikingly, 
executive compensation displayed substantial positive growth even during 
periods when stock market values decreased.26 
There are other reasons to doubt standard marginal productivity theory. 
In the United States the ratio of CEO pay to that of the average worker 
increased from around 20 to 1 in 1965 to 354 to 1 in 2012.27 There was no 
change in technology that could explain a change in relative productivity of 
that magnitude-and no explanation for why that change in technology 
would occur in the US and not in other similar countries. Moreover, the 
design of corporate compensation schemes has made it evident that they are 
not intended to reward effort: typically, they are related to the performance 
of the stock, which rises and falls depending on many factors outside the 
control of the CEO, such as market interest rates and the price of oil. It 
would have been easy to design an incentive structure with less risk, simply 
by basing compensation on relative performance, relative to a group of com-
parable companies.28 The struggles of the Clinton administration to intro-
duce tax systems encouraging so-called performance pay (without imposing 
conditions to ensure that pay was actually related to performance) and dis-
closure requirements (which would have enabled market participants to bet-
ter assess the extent of stock dilution associated with CEO stock option 
plans) clarified the battle lines: those pushing for favourable tax treatment 
and against disclosure understood well that these arrangements would have 
facilitated greater inequalities in income.29 
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For specifically the rise in top incomes in the financial sector, the evidence 
is even more unfavourable to explanations based on marginal productivity 
theory. An empirical study by Philippon and Reshef shows that in the 
past two decades workers in the financial industry have enjoyed a huge 
'pay-premium' with respect to similar sectors, which cannot be explained by 
the usual proxies for productivity (such as the level of education or unob-
served ability). According to their estimates, financial sector compensations 
have been about 40 per cent higher than the level that would have been 
expected under perfect competition.30 
It is also well documented that banks deemed 'too big to fail' enjoy a rent 
due to an implicit state guarantee. Investors know that these large financial 
institutions can count, in effect, on a government guarantee, and thus they 
are willing to provide them funds at lower interest rates. The big banks can 
thus prosper not because they are more efficient or provide better service 
but because they are in effect subsidised by taxpayers. There are other rea-
sons for the super-normal returns to the large banks and their bankers. In 
certain of the activities of the financial sector, there is far from perfect com-
petition. Anti-competitive practices in debit and credit cards have amplified 
pre-existing market power to generate huge rents. Lack of transparency (e.g. 
in over-the-counter Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and derivatives) too have 
generated large rents, with the market dominated by four players.31 It is not 
surprising that the rents enjoyed in this way by big banks translated into 
higher incomes for their managers and shareholders. 
In the financial sector even more than in other industries, executive com-
pensation in the aftermath of the crisis provided convincing evidence against 
marginal productivity theory as an explanation of wages at the top: the 
bankers who had brought their firms and the global economy to the brink of 
ruin continued to receive high rates of pay-compensation which in no way 
could be related either to their social contribution or even their contribution 
to the firms for which they worked (both of which were negative). For 
instance, a study that focused on Bear Stems and Lehman Brothers in 2000-
2008 has found that the top executive managers of these two giants had 
brought home huge amounts of 'performance-based' compensations (esti-
mated at around $1 billion for Lehman and $1.4 billion for Bear Steams), 
which were not clawed back when the two firms collapsed.32 
Still another piece of evidence supporting the importance of rent-seeking in 
explaining the increase in inequality is provided by those studies that have 
shown that increases in taxes at the very top do not result in decreases in growth 
rates. If these incomes were a result of their efforts, we might have expected those 
at the top to respond by working less hard, with adverse effects on GDP.33 
The increase in rents34 
Three striking aspects of the evolution of most rich countries in the past 
thirty-five years are (a) the increase in the wealth-to-income ratio; (b) the 
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stagnation of median wages; and (c) the failure of the return to capital to 
decline. Standard neoclassical theories, in which 'wealth' is equated with 
'capital', would suggest that the increase in capital should be associated with 
a decline in the return to capital and an increase in wages. The failure of 
unskilled workers' wages to increase has been attributed by some (especially 
in the 1990s) to skill-biased technological change, which increased the pre-
mium put by the market on skills. Hence, those with skills would see their 
wages rise, and those without skills would see them fall. But recent years 
have seen a decline in the wages paid even to skilled workers. Moreover, as 
my recent research shows,35 average wages should have increased, even if 
some wages fell. Something else must be going on. 
There is an alternative-and more plausible-explanation. It is based on 
the observation that rents are increasing (due to the increase in land rents, 
intellectual property rents and monopoly power). As a result, the value of 
those assets that are able to provide rents to their owners-such as land, 
houses and some financial claims-is rising proportionately. So overall 
wealth increases, but this does not lead to an increase in the productive 
capacity of the economy or in the mean marginal productivity or average 
wage of workers. On the contrary, wages may stagnate or even decrease, 
because the rise in the share of rents has happened at the expense of wages. 
The assets which are driving the increase in overall wealth, in fact, are 
not produced capital goods. In many cases, they are not even 'productive' 
in the usual sense; they are not directly related to the production of goods 
and services.36 With more wealth put into these assets, there may be less 
invested in real productive capital. In the case of many countries where 
we have data (such as France) there is evidence that this is indeed the 
case: a disproportionate part of savings in recent years has gone into the 
purchase of housing, which has not increased the productivity of the 'real' 
economy. 
Monetary policies that lead to low interest rates can increase the value of 
these 'unproductive' fixed assets-an increase in the value of wealth that is 
unaccompanied by any increase in the flow of goods and services. By the 
same token, a bubble can lead to an increase in wealth-for an extended 
period of time-again with possible adverse effects on the stock of 'real' pro-
ductive capital. Indeed, it is easy for capitalist economies to generate such 
bubbles (a fact that should be obvious from the historical record,37 but which 
has also been confirmed in theoretical models.38 ) While in recent years there 
has been a 'correction' in the housing bubble (and in the underlying price of 
land), we cannot be confident that there has been a full correction. The 
increase in the wealth-income ratio may still have more to do with an 
increase in the value of rents than with an increase in the amount of produc-
tive capital. Those who have access to financial markets and can get credit 
from banks (typically those already well off) can purchase these assets, using 
them as collateral. As the bubble takes off, so does their wealth and society's 
inequality. Again, policies amplify the resulting inequality: favourable tax 
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treatment of capital gains enables especially high after-tax returns on these 
assets and increases the wealth especially of the wealthy, who disproportion-
ately own such assets (and understandably so, since they are better able to 
withstand the associated risks). 
The role of institutions and politics 
The large influence of rent-seeking in the rise of top incomes undermines the 
marginal productivity theory of income distribution. The income and wealth 
of those at the top comes at least partly at the expense of others-just the 
opposite conclusion from that which emerges from trickle-down economics. 
When, for instance, a monopoly succeeds in raising the price of the goods 
which it sells, it lowers the real income of everyone else. This suggests that 
institutional and political factors play an important role in influencing the 
relative shares of capital and labour. 
As we noted earlier, in the past three decades wages have grown much 
less than productivity (Fiwre 1)-a fact which is hard to reconcile with mar-
ginal productivity theory but is consistent with increased exploitation. This 
suggests that the weakening of workers' bargaining power has been a major 
factor. Weak unions and asymmetric globalisation, where capital is free to 
move while labour is much less so, are thus likely to have contributed signif-
icantly to the great surge of inequality. 
The way in which globalisation has been managed has led to lower wages 
in part because workers' bargaining power has been eviscerated. With capi-
tal highly mobile-and with tariffs low-firms can simply tell workers that 
if they don't accept lower wages and worse working conditions, the com-
pany will move elsewhere. To see how asymmetric globalisation can affect 
bargaining power, imagine, for a moment, what the world would be like if 
there was free mobility of labour, but no mobility of capital. Countries 
would compete to attract workers. They would promise good schools and a 
good environment, as well as low taxes on workers. This could be financed 
by high taxes on capital. But that's not the world we live in. 
In most industrialised countries there has been a decline in union 
membership and influence; this decline has been especially strong in the 
Anglo-Saxon world. This has created an imbalance of economic power and a 
political vacuum. Without the protection afforded by a union, workers have 
fared even more poorly than they would have otherwise. Unions' inability 
to protect workers against the threat of job loss by the moving of jobs 
abroad has contributed to weakening the power of unions. But politics has 
also played a major role, exemplified in President Reagan's breaking of the 
air traffic controllers' strike in the US in 1981 or Margaret Thatcher's battle 
against the National Union of Mineworkers in the UK. 
Central bank policies focusing on inflation have almost certainly been a 
further factor contributing to the growing inequality and the weakening of 
workers' bargaining power. As soon as wages start to increase, and 
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especially if they increase faster than the rate of inflation, central banks 
focusing on inflation raise interest rates. The result is a higher average level 
of unemployment and a downward ratcheting effect on wages: as the econ-
omy goes into recession, real wages often fall; and then monetary policy is 
designed to ensure that they don't recover. 
Inequalities are affected not just by the legal and formal institutional 
arrangements (such as the strength of unions) but also by social custom, 
including whether it is viewed as acceptable to engage in discrimination. 
At the same time, governments have been lax in enforcing anti.-
discrimination laws. Contrary to the suggestion of free-market economists, 
but consistent with even casual observation of how markets actually 
behave, discrimination has been a persistent aspect of market economies, 
and helps explain much of what has gone on at the bottom. The 
discrimination takes many forms-in housing markets, in financial markets 
(at least one of America's large banks had to pay a very large fine for its 
discriminatory practices in the run-up to the crisis) and in labour markets. 
There is a large literature explaining how such discrimination persists.40' 41 
Of course, market forces-the demand and supply for skilled workers, 
affected by changes in technology and education-play an important role as 
well, even if those forces are partially shaped by politics. But instead of these 
market forces and politics balancing each other out, with the political pro-
cess dampening the increase in inequalities of income and wealth in periods 
when market forces have led to growing disparities, in the rich countries 
today the two have been working together to increase inequality. 
The price of inequality 
The evidence is thus unsupportive of explanations of inequality solely 
focused on marginal productivity. But what of the argument that we need 
inequality to grow? 
A first justification for the claim that inequality is necessary for growth 
focuses on the role of savings and investment in promoting growth, and is 
based on the observation that those at the top save, while those at the bot-
tom typically spend all of their earnings. Countries with a high share of 
wages will thus not be able to accumulate capital as rapidly as those with a 
low share of wages. The only way to generate savings required for long-
term growth is thus to ensure sufficient income for the rich. 
This argument is particularly inapposite today, where the problem is, to 
use Bernanke's term, a global savings glut.42 But even in those circumstances 
where growth would be increased by an increase in national savings, there 
are better ways of inducing savings than increasing inequality. The govern-
ment can tax the income of the rich, and use the funds to finance either pri-
vate or public investment; such policies reduce inequalities in consumption 
and disposable income, and lead to increased national savings (appropriately 
measured). 
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A second argument centres on the popular misconception that those at the 
top are the job creators, and giving more money to them will thus create 
more jobs. Industrialised countries are full of creative entrepreneurial people 
throughout the income distribution. What creates jobs is demand: when there 
is demand, firms will create the jobs to satisfy that demand (especially if we 
can get the financial system to work in the way it should, providing credit 
to small and medium-sized enterprises). 
In fact, as empirical research by the IMF has shown, inequality is associ-
ated with economic instability. In particular, IMF researchers have shown 
that growth spells tend to be shorter when income inequality is high. This 
result holds also when other determinants of growth duration (like external 
shocks, property rights and macroeconomic conditions) are taken into 
account: on average, a 10-percentile decrease in inequality increases the 
expected length of a growth spell by one half.43 The picture does not change 
if one focuses on medium-term average growth rates instead of growth 
duration. Recent empirical research released by the OECD shows that 
income inequality has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
medium-term growth. It estimates that in countries like the US, the UK and 
Italy, overall economic growth would have been six to nine percentage 
points higher in the past two decades had income inequality not risen.44 
There are different channels through which inequality harms the econ-
omy .45 First, inequality leads to weak aggregate demand. The reason is easy 
to understand: those at the bottom spend a larger fraction of their income 
than those at the top.46 The problem may be compounded by monetary 
authorities' flawed responses to this weak demand. By lowering interest 
rates and relaxing regulations, monetary policy too easily igves rise to an 
asset bubble, the bursting of which leads in tum to recession. 7 
Many interpretations of the current crisis have indeed emphasised the 
importance of distributional concerns.48 Growing inequality would have led to 
lower consumption but for the effects of loose monetary policy and lax regula-
tions, which led to a housing bubble and a consumption boom. It was, in short, 
only growing debt that allowed consumption to be sustained.49 But it was 
inevitable that the bubble would eventually break. And it was inevitable that, 
when it broke, the economy would go into a downturn. 
Second, inequality of outcomes is associated with inequality of opportu-
nity. When those at the bottom of the income distribution are at great risk of 
not living up to their potential, the economy pays a price not only with 
weaker demand today, but also with lower growth in the future. With 
nearly one in four American children growing up in poverty,50 many of 
them facing not just a lack of educational opportunity but also a lack of 
access to adequate nutrition and health, the country's long-term prospects 
are being put into jeopardy. 
Third, societies with greater inequality are less likely to make public 
investments which enhance productivity, such as in public transportation, 
infrastructure, technology and education. If the rich believe that they don't 
146 
INEQUALITY AND EcoNoMic GROWTH 
need these public facilities, and worry that a strong government which could 
increase the efficiency of the economy might at the same time use its powers 
to redistribute income and wealth, it is not surprising that public investment 
is lower in countries with higher inequality. Moreover, in such countries tax 
and other economic policies are likely to encourage those activities that bene-
fit the financial sector over more productive activities. In the United States 
today returns on long-term financial speculation (capital gains) are taxed at 
approximately half the rate of labour, and speculative derivatives are given 
priority in bankruptcy over workers. Tax laws encourage job creation abroad 
rather than at home. The result is a weaker and more unstable economy. 
Reforming these policies-and using other policies to reduce rent-seeking-
would not only reduce inequality; it would improve economic performance. 
It should be noted that the existence of these adverse effects of inequality 
on growth is itself evidence against an explanation of today's high level of 
inequality based on marginal productivity theory. For the basic premise of 
marginal productivity is that those at the top are simply receiving just 
deserts for their efforts, and that the rest of society benefits from their activi-
ties. If that were so, we should expect to see higher growth associated with 
higher incomes at the top. In fact, we see just the opposite. 
Reversing inequality 
A wide range of policies can help reduce inequality. Policies should be 
aimed at reducing inequalities both in market income and in the post-tax-
and-transfer incomes. The rules of the game play a large role in determining 
market distribution-in preventing discrimination, in creating bargaining 
rights for workers, in curbing monopolies and the powers of CEOs to exploit 
firms' other stakeholders and the financial sector to exploit the rest of soci-
ety. These rules were largely rewritten during the past thirty years in ways 
which led to more inequality and poorer overall economic performance. 
Now they must be rewritten once again, to reduce inequality and strengthen 
the economy, for instance, by discouraging the short-termism that has 
become rampant in the financial and corporate sector.51 
Reforms include more support for education, including pre-school; 
increasing the minimum wage; strengthening earned-income tax credits; 
strengthening the voice of workers in the workplace, including through 
unions; and more effective enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. But there 
are four areas in particular that could make inroads in the high level of 
inequality which now exists.52 
First, executive compensation (especially in the US) has become excessive, 
and it is hard to justify the design of executive compensation schemes based 
on stock options. Executives should not be rewarded for improvements in a 
firm's stock market performance in which they play no part. If the Federal 
Reserve lowers interest rates, and that leads to an increase in stock market 
prices, CEOs should not get a bonus as a result. If oil prices fall, and so 
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profits of airlines and the value of airline stocks increase, airline CEOs 
should not get a bonus. There is an easy way of taking account of these 
gains (or losses) which are not attributable to the efforts of executives: basing 
performance pay on the relative performance of firms in comparable circum-
stances. The design of good compensation schemes that do this has been 
well understood for more than a third of a century,53 and yet executives in 
major corporations have almost studiously resisted these insights. They have 
focused more on taking advantages of deficiencies in corporate governance 
and the lack of understanding of these issues by many shareholders to try to 
enhance their earnings-getting high pay when share prices increase, and 
also when share prices fall. In the long run, as we have seen, economic 
performance itself is hurt.54 
Second, macroeconomic policies are needed that maintain economic stabil-
ity and full employment. High unemployment most severely penalises those 
at the bottom and the middle of the income distribution. Today, workers are 
suffering thrice over: from high unemployment, weak wages and cutbacks 
in public services, as government revenues are less than they would be if 
economies were functioning well. 
As we have argued, high inequality has weakened aggregate demand. Fuel-
ling asset price bubbles through hyper-expansive monetary policy and dereg-
ulation is not the only possible response. Higher public investment-in 
infrastructures, technology and education-would both revive demand and 
alleviate inequality, and this would boost growth in the long-run and in the 
short-run. According to a recent empirical study by the IMF, well-designed 
public infrastructure investment raises output both in the short and long term, 
especially when the economy is operating below potential. And it doesn't 
need to increase public debt in terms of GDP: well-implemented infrastruc-
ture projects would pay for themselves, as the increase in income (and thus in 
tax revenues) would more than offset the increase in spending. 55 
Third, public investment in education is fundamental to address inequality. 
A key determinant of workers' income is the level and quality of education. If 
governments ensure equal access to education, then the distribution of wages 
will reflect the distribution of abilities (including the ability to benefit from 
education) and the extent to which the education system attempts to compen-
sate for differences in abilities and backgrounds. If, as in the United States, 
those with rich parents usually have access to better education, then one gener-
ation's inequality will be passed on to the next, and in each generation, wage 
inequality will reflect the income and related inequalities of the last. 
Fourth, these much-needed public investments could be financed through 
fair and full taxation of capital income. This would further contribute to 
counteracting the surge in inequality: it can help bring down the net return 
to capital, so that those capitalists who save much of their income won't see 
their wealth accumulate at a faster pace than the growth of the overall econ-
omy, resulting in growing inequality of wealth.56 Special provisions provid-
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57 More precisely, these are the estimated costs ('tax expenditures') associated 
with these special provisions. See Congressional Budget Office, The Distribution 
of Major Tax Expenditures in the Individual Income Tax System, May 2013, 
p. 31, http:/ I cbo.gov I sites/ default/ files/ cbofiles/ attachments/TaxExpenditures_ 
One-Column.pdf (accessed 22 December 2015). This figure includes the effects of 
the 'step-up of basis at death' provision, which reduces the taxes that heirs pay 
on capital gains. Not including this provision, the ten-year budgetary cost of pref-
erential treatment for capital gains and dividends is $1.34 trillion. These calcula-
tions do not, however, include the value of the fact that the tax on capital gains 
is postponed until realisation. 
58 See J. E. Stiglitz, Reforming Taxation to Promote Growth and Equity, Roosevelt Insti-
tute White Paper, May 2014, http:/ /rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/ 
Stiglitz_Reforming_Taxation_ White_Paper_Roosevelt_Institute.pdf (accessed 22 
December 2015). 
59 The Commission's report was released in 2009, and published as J. Stiglitz, A. 
Sen and J. P. Fitoussi, Mismeasuring Our Lives, New York, The New Press, 2010. 
The OECD has since continued work in this vein with its Better Life Initiative 
(http: I I www.oecd.org/ statistics /betterlifeinitiativemeasuringwell-beingandprogress. 
htm (accessed 22 December 2015)) and its High Level Expert Group on the mea-
surement of economic and social progress, convened in 2013. 
60 See Stiglitz, Rewriting the Rules. 
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